Writing Effective Security Abuse Cases by Srivratanakul, Thitima et al.
	



		





	

	
				
  
	
!	∀	#∀∃∀%
&∋

(    )   )∗+ )∗+∗,−
∀
.
∋

(    )   /)∗0)10++,∋  0,	(2	!	3&4∃

	5
∃
#	!
	6	#	
∃
#	!∀
	3
5









	7	

				

  
 
Writing Effective Security Abuse Cases 
 
 
 
Thitima Srivatanakul, John A. Clark and Fiona Polack 
 
 
 
 
University of York Technical Report YCS-2004-375 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of York 
 
Department of Computer Science 
 
 
14 May 2004  
 
    
 
Abstract 
 
 
We grow increasingly dependent on the appropriate operation of computer-based 
systems. One aspect of such systems is security. As systems become more complex 
current means of analysis will probably prove ineffective. In the safety domain a 
variety of analysis techniques has emerged over many years. These have proved 
surprisingly effective. Since the safety and security domains share many similarities, 
various authors have suggested that safety techniques might usefully find application 
in security. This report takes one such technique, HAZOPs, and applies it to one 
widely used informal design component – UML’s use cases. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Computer security is increasingly problematic; threats to systems and the data stored 
on them grow as computer networking and computer literacy increase.  Computers are 
now an obvious target for the disgruntled employee, the rejected partner, the 
disenfranchised constituent, and the fraudster.  With increased opportunity, attacks 
become more novel, complex and unpredictable.  
 
To make matters worse, the criticality of computer systems is increasing.  Many 
organisations rely on stored data, business or management programs, internet 
connections and the web/email facilities that the internet supports.  Security breaches 
have the potential to cause dramatic losses of money, confidence, reputation, or even 
of life.  
 
To combat the increased number and severity of security risks, systems development 
needs to analyse security with particular care and rigour. Security analysis should be 
an essential part of all computer-related engineering practices.  Although security was 
one of the first domains to embrace formal development techniques and processes, 
much security analysis remains informal. At the requirements level most analysis is 
informal; with the increased complexity of emerging systems there is a pressing need 
to add rigour to the process of engineering security requirements. 
 
Some requirements may be expressed as ‘use cases’. This paper investigates the 
systematic use of a technique from the safety domain (HAZOPs) and shows how it 
can be applied to use cases to elicit and explore their security aspects. 
 
1.1 Motivation 
 
Research in security has emphasized particular aspects of security or technologies 
required to implement security mechanisms.  Confidentiality properties, for example, 
have been analysed mathematically by many authors and there has been a vast amount 
of research into cryptography.  However, these are only partial solutions to the 
security problem. Much security research has been sponsored by Governmental 
organisations and the research tends to reflect Governmental security concerns. 
Modern systems, over a range of application domains, have security issues. Reaching 
for pre-defined templates of what were relevant security problems and their solutions 
will often not suffice.  Much more subtlety will be needed to determine in what 
security for a system should consist and how assurance can be gained that the 
developed system provides it.   
 
It is universally asserted that security must be built-in, but proper integration of 
security development and analysis processes with the development of the rest of the 
system is not common.  Bolt-on ‘security’ is a frequent approach. One can understand 
this lack of proper integration. System development is hard enough under benign 
conditions, let alone in the presence of malice. Attacks may come from all directions, 
from exploiting radio frequency leakage, through power consumption of a smart card 
leaking key information, to more social/personnel aspects such as what has recently 
been described as cognitive hacking [23].  Expertise across the relevant domains is 
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generally not possessed by any one person. Furthermore, for modern complex systems 
we might question whether ‘expertise’ is really enough. Expertise depends on 
previous experience. Many modern systems give rise to new security concerns and 
experts have a hard time coping with novel systems. Commonly used analysis 
techniques (e.g. checklists/profiles) are too rigid to uncover new threats. 
 
Integrating security with the design process is further complicated because 
developments are usually iterative and so security issues must be addressed iteratively 
(with all that entails). Furthermore, evolution of systems is a natural part of the 
lifecycle and presents significant challenges for secure systems. Maintaining rigour 
under change is hard and expensive; much more so if certification requires externally 
provided evidence, such as that provided by independent evaluation. 
 
The above problems are not unique to security. Safety critical and safety related 
systems present similar problems, but safety analysis and development would appear 
more tightly integrated. Part of the reason for this, perhaps, is that the safety domain 
has developed many simple but effective analysis tools whose results are seen to 
affect the design process in a significant way. These tools are typically understood by 
non-safety experts (though their effective use requires skill), allowing various 
stakeholders to bring their knowledge to bear in the service of safety, or allowing 
experts to exercise their craft with increased rigour.  Might such safety techniques 
usefully be applied to security? 
 
1.2 Solutions from safety 
 
The scale and scope of security risk in modern computer systems requires systematic, 
rigorous techniques that are part of standard development processes. Techniques 
applied in the development of safety-critical systems tend to be well-defined and 
systematic. They have proven effective over many years. 
 
Safety and security have many similarities. Both are concerned with the management 
of risk. Safety typically concerns itself with reducing the risk of loss of life or 
environmental damage to tolerable levels.  Security concerns itself with engineering 
acceptable levels of risk to various assets (and is most typically concerned with 
threats to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information, and threats to 
the supporting infrastructure). Development concepts and practices from one domain 
have found interpretation or direct application in the other. For example, notions of 
graded assurance were first seen in the security domain; the US DoD’s Trusted 
Computer Security Evaluation Criteria [65] (a.k.a. the ‘Orange Book’, due to the 
colour of its cover) required increased functionality and increased rigour in design to 
cope with various levels of system risk. The concept of graded assurance migrated to 
the safety domain, where functionality and assurance were separated (and so very 
simple functionality could be required to have high assurance). This separation of 
functionality and assurance has been adopted in recent security standards, such as the 
‘Common Criteria’ [18].  Formal methods found application in the 1970s and 1980s 
primarily in security and subsequently became a mainstay of much safety-oriented 
research. 
 
Perhaps the most important similarity is that rigorous arguments are generally 
required to justify the deployment of safe and secure systems. Systems must be 
demonstrably safe or secure.  In recent years, the notion of a safety case has emerged - 
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a rigorous, well-structured and understandable marshalling of evidence that a system 
is suitable to be deployed, i.e. is acceptably safe. Safety analysts already have 
numerous techniques at their disposal for generating and recording evidence and these 
can be adapted for security assurance evidence. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [58] has 
inspired security Threat Trees [2] and Attack Trees [62].  These approaches 
systematically decompose goals, representing the findings in a tree structure. MOAT 
[42] is a security argumentation technique that uses FTA notations to express its 
assurance arguments. More sophisticated argumentation [57] is available via 
derivatives of the Goal Structured Notation [39]. 
 
Techniques for the investigation of deviations (unintended or unexpected behaviour 
[59]), developed for safety critical systems, also appear in security work. The abuse 
case model [53][54] expresses deviation from normal system use by specific actors.  
This work takes as its starting point use cases, a requirements technique from the 
Unified Modeling Language (UML) and related development methods.  This clearly 
satisfies the need to integrate security analysis with conventional systems 
development; UML is increasingly the notation of choice in systems development.  
However, the technique again focuses on expressing the effect of known security 
threats; it is not capable of systematically seeking other possible threats.  Systematic 
deviational techniques such as HAZOP [60][68], successfully used in safety critical 
systems, are little used in security.  One doctoral study [31] applies HAZOP to 
protocol requirements analysis, to systematically investigate unknown threats and 
attacks on protocols. 
 
We propose an extension of abuse cases, providing a more rigorous approach to 
analysing security. We apply the principles of HAZOP, tailored to a security 
perspective, to an existing functional requirements representation (i.e. use cases). The 
approach systematically mutates the model and its elements, thus prompting 
identification of a wide range of threats and other non-functional requirements. 
 
The next section of the report discusses the concept and uses of HAZOP in more 
detail. Section 3 introduces and elaborates use case.  Section 4 outlines the proposed 
method and the necessary interpretations of HAZOP guidewords. Section 5 provides 
guidance on the derivation of the use case deviants. Section 6 presents a simple case 
study of an e-commerce system. The report concludes with a summary of our 
findings.  
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2. HAZOP: A rigorous approach to security analysis 
 
Security analysis must determine cost-effective controls to make a system’s assets  
secure against credible threats. These threats may include loss of confidentiality, 
integrity, availability etc.  Damage may also include secondary damage, e.g. to 
reputation. The analysis must explore the vulnerability of the system to these threats, 
the probability that such vulnerabilities may be exploited to form attacks, and 
determine the potential impact of attacks. Cost-effective counter-measures are then 
sought. Clearly, efficient identification of threats is key to the development of secure 
systems.  HAZOP is a technique widely used in safety; it presents a possible approach 
to systematic security threat identification. 
 
2.1 HAZOP 
 
HAZOP is the technique of Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP).  It is a 
qualitative technique, developed by chemical producers to systematically identify 
potential hazards and operability problems in designs for new chemical plants. 
Traditional approaches based on checklists and intuition were capable of checking, for 
example, the effects of a valve not opening or not closing; HAZOP guidewords 
encouraged other (more subtle) scenarios to be identified, such as the valve being 
part-open, or sluggish in its opening. A systematic description of the technique 
applied to safety in computer and other systems is given in [68][60]. 
 
The basic principle of HAZOP is that hazards arise due to deviations from normal or 
intended behaviours. Like identification of systems requirements, HAZOP is best 
conducted as a team analysis activity, ideally using people with various backgrounds. 
The team, led by a HAZOP leader, systematically investigates each of the system 
elements to identify deviations from the design intent. Each of the identified deviants 
is then further investigated to ascertain possible causes and effects.  The identification 
of deviations is prompted by a set of guidewords/guidephrases, where each related 
guideword/guidephrase is applied to each attribute.  A pipe in a chemical plant might 
have fluid flow as an attribute. The guideword “NO/NONE” prompts us to consider 
what would happen if no fluid flowed (for whatever reason).  Similarly, for a petrol 
tank, with attribute content “petrol”, the guide phrase “OTHER THAN” prompts us to 
consider what would happen if the wrong kind of petrol were present (for example, 
use of leaded petrol in an engine designed for unleaded fuel might wreck that engine), 
or fluid other than petrol were used. 
 
The technique is flexible. For example, it is possible to apply it to manual or 
automated procedures. A replacement procedure for an aircraft windscreen might 
have a step requiring the engineer to fasten the screen with identified bolts. What 
would happen if the wrong kind (“OTHER THAN”) of bolt were used, or even if the 
whole step were omitted (“NONE”) for a particular bolt? An aircraft engine 
maintenance procedure might require the level of oil to be checked in an engine with 
oil caps being securely replaced after the checks. What would happen if such caps 
were not replaced (use of ‘NOT’)? 
1
 
                                                 
1 Accidents have actually arisen with such causes. An aeroplane landed with the pilot unconscious 
having been half sucked out of the cockpit at 17000 feet having lost the windscreen after replacement. 
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The generic set of guidewords of HAZOP, as incorporated in UK Defence Standard 
OO-58 [68], is provided in Table 1.  
 
Guidewords Meaning 
NO or 
NOT or NONE 
None of the design intent is achieved 
MORE Quantitative increase in a parameter 
LESS Quantitative decrease in a parameter 
AS WELL AS or 
MORE THAN 
An additional activity occurs 
PART OF Only some of the design intent is achieved 
REVERSE Logical opposite of the design intention occurs 
OTHER THAN Complete substitution. Another activity takes place. 
 
Table 1: HAZOP guide words [68]. 
 
A key part of HAZOP analysis is to interpret the guidewords for the context of 
interest.  For example, Table 2 shows variations or interpretations of the guidewords 
for application to the timing of events or actions. 
 
Guidewords Meaning Interpretation 
NO 
 
Event/action never takes place. 
EARLY Event/action takes place before it is 
expected. 
LATE Event/action takes place after it is 
expected. 
BEFORE Happens before another event or action 
that is expected to precede it. 
Timing of Event or Action 
AFTER Happens after another event or action 
that is expected to come after it. 
 
Table 2: Example guide word interpretations for timing [68]. 
 
HAZOP has gained wide acceptance: 00-58 [68] recommends HAZOP for hazard 
analysis in any safe system development; it has been successfully applied to the safety 
analysis and operation of chemical plants, aircraft, and many other products.  
 
HAZOP has also been applied to the security domain. For example, Foster [31] has 
applied it to the generation and analysis of security protocols requirements. She stated 
that protocol development is relatively unstructured and as a consequence can 
produce protocols vulnerable to attack. The technique prompts the analyst to consider 
unknown threats and attacks on protocols. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
84 out of 90 bolts were of smaller than required diameter. (BAC One Eleven over Oxfordshire 1990) 
[43]. In another incident, a pilot managed an emergency landing after oil drained out of all engines; one 
engineer had maintained all four aircraft engines and omitted to replace the oil caps. 
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Winther et. al. [69] has adapted HAZOP guidewords to generate new guidelines 
specific to security attributes. However, the derived guidewords are too restricted, and 
are not flexible enough to bring out most of the analysts’ creativity. We have 
indicated a general approach to applying HAZOPs for security.  Specialising the 
technique for a particular domain allows increased rigour and indeed efficiency.  
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3. Use cases 
 
The use case technique, now popularised as part of the UML [61], was proposed by 
Jacobson [38] to describe behaviours of a system from a user’s perspective. Typically, 
a use case characterises interactions between an actor (usually a user, but possibly 
another system) and a system.  There is a visual representation, the use case diagram, 
and a tabular format. Figure 1 depicts the fundamental elements of the use case in 
diagrammatic form. The actor (a stick-man) interacts (an association line) with a use 
case (an ellipse). 
 
Controller
Display Flight Path
Actors
Association
Use Case
 
 
Figure 1: Fundamental use case elements. 
 
  
Actors represent external users or other systems that have an interaction or association 
with the system. An actor characterises the role that users or other external systems 
may have in relation to the system.  
 
x Actors are everything that needs to exchange information with the system 
[38].  Human and non-human interaction with the system can be expressed, 
and actors can represent individual or collective roles. 
 
x Association lines connect an actor with the use case.  This represents an 
interaction (communication) or association between the actor and that use 
case.  The interaction may represent the exchange of information between the 
actor and the system or the invocation of the system’s operation by the actor 
and vice versa.  
 
x Use cases represent the system’s behaviour from the external perspective, 
the task that the system must achieve on behalf of the actor(s) with which it 
interacts.  Different authors document use cases in different ways. In general, 
the description comprises pre-condition, post-condition and sequences of 
actions (scenarios) including variants. The pre-condition defines the states that 
the system must be in for the use case to execute. The post-condition defines 
the state properties required after executing the use case. 
 
The tabular form of a use case is a text description of how an interaction is 
accomplished.  The different outcomes of a use case can be expressed using scenarios 
(action steps). There is little agreement as to what should be included in the tables. 
 
In UML (and the related methods), use cases are almost always used to capture and 
express functional and late requirements.  They represent the system and its 
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interactions, in a simple form that is easily understood by the different parties 
involved.  In the Unified Process [45], the expression of use cases is the foundation 
for subsequent development activities, as the captured requirements are fed into the 
specification and design process.  
 
Recent work has applied use case modelling to requirements analyses other than the 
purely functional. Abuse and misuse cases are proposed as (intuitive) means to 
capture and analyse security requirements [53][54][63]. Sindre [63] notes that both 
security and safety requirements can be elicited from use case diagram and scenarios.  
Douglass [26] shows that use case modelling can be used to document some non-
functional requirements, for example, by annotating each action in use case scenarios 
with its timing constraints. Work by Allenby et. al. [1] on the elicitation and analysis 
of safety requirements also uses HAZOP on use case scenarios. The analysis results in 
a tabular form describing the likely catastrophic failures, their causes and effects. 
 
Use cases, like abuse or mis-use cases, are potentially useful in the analysis of 
security requirements. The system interfaces presented to an attacker may be 
characterised by use cases.  The attacker may ‘stay within the rules’ (but do so in a 
particularly clever way), or may choose to deviate from what is intended as acceptable 
behaviour. Attacks may often be regarded as ‘exceptional flows’ in a use case. 
Existing abuse case approaches do not give any systematic way of generating such 
unusual deviations. In this report we show how HAZOPs can be used to generate 
alternative or exceptional behaviours in a systematic way.  
 
We regard our approach as a useful tool. Since not all system requirements will be 
recorded as use cases, other analyses have to be carried out too. Though HAZOPs 
may prove useful in those contexts too, in this report we restrict ourselves only to the 
analysis of use cases. 
 8
    
 
 
4. Method procedures and guidelines  
 
Our approach starts from system use cases.   These might be taken from the initial 
phase of the system development.  In normal usage, the use cases would model only 
high-level functional requirements.  The aim of our approach is to systematically 
analyse the system to identify potential threats and security requirements. 
 
Our technique applies the HAZOP guidewords, with suitable interpretations, to 
elements of the use case. The elements incorporated are those that could be subject to 
deviations leading to meaningful results. 
 
4.1 The analysis process 
 
The essential steps of the analysis process are as follows. 
 
1. From a use case, identify and record:   
a. intent and capability of actors;  
b. associations between actors and use cases; 
c. components from use case description: pre-condition, main flow of 
events, alternative flows of events (i.e. normal but perhaps less likely 
and exceptional /error flow of events) and post-condition. 
 
2. Apply HAZOP guidewords with the appropriate interpretation to each element 
identified in step 1, to suggest deviations. 
 
3. Evaluate whether the identified deviations violate, or could violate, any stated 
security properties. Investigate possible causes of the deviations. 
 
4. Identify consequences that may arise from the deviations (extract affected 
assets from the identified consequences.) 
 
5. Categorise the deviations identified, and generalise each group.  
 
6. Provide recommendations or requirements on the identified problems/threats. 
 
4.2 Use case elements and their security deviations 
 
A use case describes a sequence of events, typically expressed by scenarios. Actions 
are expressed under various conditions, responding to a request from one of the actors 
that has an association with it. We identify elements that are subject to deviations for 
each of the main elements of a use case.  
 
Actors 
 
Each actor possesses different characteristics. Actor roles can be distinguished by 
their intent and capability.  The characteristics determine the deviations that are 
possible for each actor; the ways in which actors deviate from their normal role may 
have different impacts on the system. Deviations from the actor’s intent or actions 
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(deviations from goals), whether intentional or accidental, can reveal new threats to 
the system.  Sometimes, new malicious actors are also identified by considering 
intentional deviation from expected actor behaviour. 
 
The deviation of actors needs to take notice of the different potential resources and 
skills of individuals (or systems) playing the roles represented as actors. For example, 
a cyber-terrorist network usually has more ability to cause attacks than an individual 
teenage hacker, in terms of access to resources and skills.  In gambling or gaming 
environments, actors may have differing local computational capabilities. Similarly, 
most actors will not have supercomputing facilities, but in some cases this may make 
a difference. Actors may differ in their ability to screen incoming information (e.g. for 
email viruses). Actors may also differ in the protocols they are able to support etc. A 
network administrator is able to access many more files or programs than a normal 
user. For human actors, one person may play different roles in the system and the 
roles a person may possess can be limited or restricted. For example, the same person 
is not allowed to both process and approve a payment.   
 
The intent of an actor is an interesting concept. An actor may obey all security policy 
rules and participate in a seemingly innocuous interaction. However, it may be that 
the real intent is to signal information via a covert channel. 
 
Associations 
 
An association of the actor with a use case models the external interactions with the 
system through the functionality modelled in the use case. The significance of 
restricting access to an operation to a particular group of users (an actor), and of 
assignment of access controls to a particular user or actor could be highlighted by this 
part of the analysis. In secure systems, access to functionality depends on actor roles. 
We need to have a clear idea of which actors should be able to access which use cases 
for which purposes. Such control may be enforced in several ways. For example, 
access controls may form an explicit part of the use case (i.e. suitable authorisation 
checks are made by the system), or else physical access to particular terminals may be 
restricted to authorised personnel. (Such alternative refinements of system goals are 
addressed in [56]).   
 
Availability is now a security goal for many systems. HAZOP application to 
associations such as NO association might reveal potential causes such as simple 
equipment malfunctioning (e.g. a keyboard refusing to acknowledge particular key 
presses, or else network failure). Inappropriate configuration may also result in 
associations not being effected. 
 
Unintended associations are a particular problem. Use cases record only intended 
associations.  An association represents an actor’s ability to exchange matter or 
information across some interface. Intentional interactions use identified associations. 
It is intended that the channels used by the actors are the only relevant ones. However, 
physics often implements unintended associations. A communications cable may 
provide a point-to-point channel, but may also emit electromagnetic radiation that can 
be picked up by a suitably equipped eavesdropper. In a similar vein, an 
electromagnetic ‘pulse gun’ may seriously harm or even destroy equipment from 
short range. Electromagnetic interference may also be a problem without any 
deliberate action. Covert channels can be considered as unintended associations. More 
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generally, consideration of unintended associations points to a need for issues of zonal 
analysis to be considered [64].  However, at this point we indicate a general 
opportunity to consider such matters at the use case level (even if only briefly, or to 
highlight the need for particular analyses later in the development). 
 
Several associations may be current for an actor; the actor may indeed engage in 
parallel instance of the same use case. In on-line gambling, this may allow for 
instances of collusion. It is possible also that uses cases executed in quick succession 
may cause problems (e.g. in a distributed cash system it may be possible to carry out a 
second withdrawal before a central database has processed a successful confirmation 
of the first, leading to withdrawal limits being exceeded).  
 
Use Cases 
  
The use case pre- and post-condition both represent states of the system at certain sets 
of times. Deviations from these normally-reached states causes deviant interactions 
and could result in exceptions to the flow of events. We can address the variations 
from the normal behaviour, by considering the deviations of each step in the use case 
and investigating the causes. 
  
4.3 HAZOP security guidewords 
 
Tables 3 to 5 show the interpretations of HAZOP guidewords that we propose for 
application to the use case elements and their features. In interpreting the guide words 
some measure of scoping will be needed, for example “OTHER THAN” applied to an 
action or result could cover a huge number of possibilities. We leave such pragmatic 
decisions scooping to the analyst. 
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An actor has an action, representing an intent, and a capability, representing the skills 
and resources at their disposal. 
 
Element: Actors 
 
Features Guide words Interpretations 
NO The action/intent does not take place. 
MORE More action is achieved. This may be one of the following: 
Sequential Repeat – the same actions take place repeatedly. 
Parallel Repeat - – the same actions take place concurrently. 
Extreme Intent – some scalar attribute of the action is affected (e.g. 
extreme parameter values are used in service invocations).  
LESS Less action is achieved than intended. The intended actions are 
incomplete or insufficient. 
AS WELL AS As well as the intended or normal action, some unexpected 
supplementary or contradictory actions occur or are intended. 
Action (Intent) 
OTHER 
THAN 
The action achieves an incorrect result. 
Alternatively, the actor may use facilities for purposes other than those 
intended, i.e. abuse of privilege (some OTHER THAN actions may lead 
to exceptional scenarios). 
NO Lack of the capability to perform the action. 
MORE More general capability, allowing more to be achieved than intended. 
LESS Less general capability, allowing less to be achieved than is required. 
PART OF The actor has only part of, or is missing a specific part of the capability. 
Capability 
AS WELL AS As well as the specific capabilities required, the actor has other specific 
capabilities. 
 
Table 3. The interpretations of guide words for an actor. 
 
An association is not considered to have additional features.  However, more guide 
words are appropriate: 
 
Element: Association 
 
Features Guide words Interpretations 
NO Association does not/can not take place. 
MORE Superfluous – Interface permits greater functionality to a particular actor 
than is required. More functionality is available. Association is not 
constrained as required. Further divisions are: 
In-parallel with – More functionality is provided/occurs simultaneously 
with the permitted ones. 
In- sequence with – More functionality provided/occurs before or after 
the permitted ones. 
LESS Interface permits less functionality to a particular actor than is required. 
Association is over-constrained. 
AS WELL AS Associations to a particular use case take place with other actors as well. 
REVERSE Interaction takes place in the reverse direction. 
Associations 
OTHER 
THAN 
Wrong association is defined. 
Swapping roles – Swapping of associations between actors or 
individuals. 
 
Table 4. The interpretations of guide words for an association. 
 
Finally, for the use case itself, the temporal guide words are included: 
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Element: Use Case Elements 
 
Features Guide words Interpretations 
NO The state or condition does not take place or is not detected. 
AS WELL AS Additional conditions apply. This may mean that more stringent checks 
are made, or else a more restrictive state results than is strictly required. 
Errors of commission might be considered here. 
PART OF Only a subset of the required conditions applies. This might for example, 
result from incomplete checks (e.g. access control checks or integrity 
checks), by incomplete implementation (a program doesn’t do all it 
should), or because the consequences of system behaviour are not fully 
understood. 
State (defined 
in a pre-
condition or a 
post- condition) 
OTHER 
THAN 
An incorrect condition applies. Perhaps the wrong data is used. 
NO No action takes place. 
MORE More action is achieved. A stronger post-condition is achieved. More 
actions could be carried out: 
 
Repeat – the same actions take place repeatedly. 
Superfluous – the system does different additional actions to those 
intended or required.   
 
A Trojan horse usually implements more functionality than is apparent, 
for example. Additionally, an action may take place for longer than 
required. 
LESS Less is achieved than intended. A weaker post-condition could result. 
For example, an action is incomplete, or an action takes place for a 
shorter time than required, or an action stopped earlier than expected. 
Action 
OTHER 
THAN 
An incorrect action takes place. An action not intended or required takes 
place instead. For example, wrong detail is provided or a wrong button is 
pressed. 
LESS Less is achieved than intended.  For example, Drop – Miss one or more 
parts of action. 
Additionally, a sequence of action takes place for a shorter time than 
required. 
AS WELL AS The sequence does the intended actions plus others. 
REVERSE The sequence of actions takes place in reverse order  (and other out-of-
order concepts). 
EARLY The action sequence or its components takes place before it is expected 
(timing). 
LATE The action sequence or its components takes place after it is expected 
(timing). 
BEFORE The action sequence or its components happens before another action 
that is expected to precede it. 
AFTER The action sequence or its components happens after another action that 
is expected to come after it. 
Sequence of 
Actions 
(scenarios) 
OTHER 
THAN 
An incorrect action sequence takes place. 
 
Table 5. The interpretations of the guidewords for a use case. 
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5. Deriving use case deviants 
 
The guidewords alone do not give a clear idea of how to derive deviants from use 
cases.  This section provides additional guidance for performing the use-case-based 
security analysis, based on experience of applying the technique. Note that, in 
applying the guidewords, much repetition is expected. Analysts must ensure that any 
apparent repetition is indeed repetition and not a subtle variation of a previously-
identified threat. 
 
The derivation of deviants must consider at least the three fundamental security 
properties (i.e. confidentiality, integrity and availability). The emphasis will vary 
between applications. The guidance also includes high-level patterns of analysis. 
 
Viewpoint considerations/Stakeholders’ interests 
 
Stakeholders are individuals or organisations that have an interest in the system, even 
though they are not a direct part of the system, and may not directly interact with the 
system.   One (partial) definition of a stakeholder is an authority (not a hacker!) that 
has an authorised ability to cause the system to cease to exist or cease to operate.  
Each stakeholder in a system has a viewpoint, representing his or her interest in the 
system.  Stakeholders’ interests might be in conflict. 
 
Security analysis must take account of different viewpoints, and of the seniority or 
importance of the stakeholders.  For example, some stakeholders are concerned about 
the integrity of classified information; others may find confidentiality of personal data 
more important.  Deviations from all stakeholder interests should be considered.  
 
Role/actor mapping 
 
Deviation analysis must consider the possibility of unexpected interactions through 
shared and multiple roles. A computer system is built to support the roles of humans 
or of machines. An actor characterises the role that the users or other external systems 
play in relation to the computer system. Individuals within roles are not distinguished, 
and an individual may play different roles at different times. 
 
A multi-user role always has potential deviations in which the actual user within a 
role initiating some interaction is not the same as the actual user receiving a response. 
 
The use case definition of actors and roles may be confused, allowing individuals to 
operate outside their intended or authorised roles. 
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Business Rules 
 
A business rule defines a business aspects or constraint on a system. It consists of 
policy, some constraints and a validation audit.  The business rule influences the way 
that the interactions with the system are specified.  
 
Business rules should include statements of the required security policy (e.g. auditing, 
integrity or confidentiality of data).  However, in practice, security policies are at best 
implicit.  The use case analysis helps to make explicit the security policy, and the 
system requirements must then be modified so that the functional requirements 
respect these policies.  
 
When deriving the deviations, it is essential to consider what sort of business rules the 
system does or should enforce. 
 
Well-known sources of security violations 
 
Although the systematic HAZOP approach is a significant improvement on earlier 
intuitive analyses, it is important not to ignore or neglect the “checklists” of 
accumulated wisdom in security.  Three common sources of security violation are 
timing, HCI, and presentation.  
 
x Timing information is not always explicit in use case diagrams and 
descriptions. However, whenever timing may be associated with events or 
actions, timing deviations must be taken into account. Typically, timing issues 
include response time (time between input to output) and repetition time (time 
between successive updates or outputs). Deviations from timing are events 
that occur later, earlier, sooner or longer than expected. In terms of security, 
this may leak information or encourage odd or unfortunate user actions.  
 
x Poor HCI design, for example implicit system response or lack of 
acknowledgement message, may be misleading to users of a system.   Security 
problems may also arise if the HCI functions overload the system, or if the 
users cannot understand how to use the system as intended.   Use case analysis 
occurs too early in development to include a detailed study of the HCI and its 
security implications.  However, the consideration of known HCI pitfalls may 
help to identify security “anti-requirement”: things that the system must not do 
if it is to be acceptably secure. 
 
x Presentation issues include the way in which data is presented to users by a 
system.  For example, intent and actions may be influenced by the order or 
format of data listed on the screen.  Essentially, presentation is part of the 
conversion of data into information; varying the presentation changes the 
information that a user can extract.  The most obvious security pitfall is 
perhaps inference.  However, there are many more subtle presentational 
effects to be considered when deriving deviations.   
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6. Example application 
 
This section presents a simple case study. The use cases describing an apparently-
innocuous web-ordering system are analysed to systematically reveal threats. 
 
6.1 System description 
 
A website hosts a company’s product catalogue that anyone using the internet can 
access and browse.  A customer who are registered with the company can order goods 
via the website. To order goods, the registered customer must provide sufficient 
payment and delivery detail.  If customers who are not registered but wish to 
purchase, the ordering facility provides an initial registration procedure.  
 
Orders are processed by an operator, who logs on to the host system.  The operator 
may change his/her login password when required.  
 
The use case diagram is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Customer
E-Commerce System
Operator
Browse catalog
Register customer
Order goods
Change password
 
 
Figure 2: Simple e-commerce system use case diagram. 
 
Table 6 lists the stakeholders in the web ordering system. 
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Stakeholders-Interests list 
 
Stakeholders Interest 
Company owner Profits and reputation of the company 
System manager System’s performance and operation of 
staff. 
Developer Correct operation of the program. 
 
Table 6: Stakeholders-Interest list. 
Table 7 summarises the intents of the use case actors. 
 
Actor-Goal list 
 
Actor Goal 
Customer Browse catalogue 
 Register  
 Order goods 
Operator Process order goods 
 
Table 7: Actor-Goal list. 
 
Use Case Descriptions 
 
The following descriptions elaborate each use case in Figure 2. 
 
Use case name: Browse Catalogue 
Goal: To explore the lists of goods available from the system. 
Actor(s): Customer 
Preconditions: The customer has access to the internet. 
Main flow of 
events: 
1. The customer enters the e-commerce website. 
2. The customer selects the Browse Catalogue section. 
3. The system displays lists of products to the customer. 
4. The customer browses the catalogue for a particular product. 
5. The customer finds the product. 
Alternate flows: User cannot find product he/she wanted. Use case ends. 
Post conditions: The product is found. 
 
 
Use case name: Register customer 
Goal: To register a customer identity with the system. 
Actor(s): Customer 
Preconditions: The customer has access to the website. 
The customer has not registered before. 
Main flow of 
events: 
1. The customer enters the Register Customer section. 
2. The system displays the new customer registration form. 
3. The customer provides registration details. 
4. The customer submits the registration form. 
5. The system updates its registration data information. 
Alternate flows: The customer has already registered. Use case ends. 
Post conditions: The customer is registered and the details are saved to a database. 
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Use case name: Order goods 
Goal: To order goods from the system. 
Actor(s): Customer 
Operator 
Preconditions: The customer is registered to order goods. 
The customer has entered registration details e.g. user name and 
password (the customer is logged on to the ordering section). 
Main flow of 
events: 
1. The customer enters Order Goods section. 
2. The system displays the customer’s account detail. 
3. For each product that the customer wishes to order, the customer 
enters its identity. 
4. The customer provides delivery details. 
5. The system calculates and displays the price of the goods 
ordered. 
6. The customer submits payment details. 
7. The system confirms the result of transaction. 
8. The operator collects the detail of the order. 
9. The operator processes the order. 
Alternate flows:  
Post conditions: The order and its detail are entered on the system and the order is 
processed.  
 
 
 
Use case name: Change Password 
Goal: Change the password for the login  
Actor(s): Operator 
Preconditions: The operator is logged in. 
Main flow of 
events: 
1. The operator enters his/her current password 
2. The system validates the password. 
3. The operator enters a new password, twice, as prompted by the 
system. 
4. The operator confirms the change. 
5. The system saves the new password. 
Alternate flows: A1. If the operator’s old password is incorrect, an error message 
should be displayed and the password should not be changed. 
A2. If the two entries of the new passwords do not match, the 
operator is prompted to re-enter them. 
Post conditions: The password of the operator is changed and updated in the 
database. 
 
 
6.2 Analysis 
 
The use case descriptions document functional requirements for the e-commerce 
system, capturing the interactions between the actors and the system. From the use 
cases and their descriptions, we can identify the actors’ intents (these can be taken 
from the actor-goal list), actors’ capabilities, associations of customer and operator 
with the use cases, the preconditions and post conditions of the use case, and a 
sequence of events of order goods. Each of the elements and features is subject to 
deviation. Table 8 to Table 11 show the analysis results for the system. 
 18
    
 
 
Elements Guideword-Deviation Cause Effects Threats involved. Comments 
Use Case: Browse Catalogue 
Actor 
Customer’s Action – 
Browse Catalogue 
Not Relevant     
NO – Customer does not 
have the ability to 
browse the catalogue. 
x Physical – lack of 
computer system, lack of 
access to internet  
x Knowledge - does not 
know the website, no 
knowledge of using an 
internet system. 
The system misses opportunity 
for one potential customer. 
x Steal computer set 
x Block internet 
account 
x Provide wrong info 
about the website. 
x Modify website URL 
 
MORE – Customer has 
more ability than 
required. 
x Access hidden links. Access of unwanted/
confidential information. 
   Any confidential
data must not be 
made available for 
public access. 
Customer’s Capability – 
Browse Catalogue 
LESS – Customer does 
not have much ability. 
x Physical – lack of 
appropriate computer
system, lack of access to 
internet  
 
The system misses opportunity 
for one potential customer. 
x Knowledge - does not 
know the website, no 
knowledge of using an 
internet system. 
x Steal computer set 
x Block internet access 
Timeouts may 
come into force. 
Associations 
Association - Customer 
and Browse Catalogue 
NO – Customer does not 
have association with 
Browse Catalogue use 
case. 
Same as NO in Customer’s 
Capability 
   
 19
    
Elements Guideword-Deviation Cause Effects Threats involved. Comments 
 OTHER THAN – Other 
people can browse the 
catalogue. Not of 
security relevance, any 
person is legitimate to 
browse the catalogue. 
    
Use Case Elements 
Pre-condition - The 
customer has access to 
the internet 
NO - The customer 
cannot access to the 
internet. 
x Loss of network and 
other physical equipment. 
x Internet account
expires. 
 
x The system misses 
opportunity for one potential 
customer. 
x ISP not available 
x Wrong configuration of 
network. 
x Customer’s frustration Denial-of-service  Strictly, this is a 
problem for the 
customer. Can 
make server side as 
flexible as possible. 
NO – The customer 
cannot enter the system 
website. 
x The e-commerce server 
is down (or malfunctioning 
in some way). 
x Loss of network. 
x The system is
blocked/overloaded 
 
x Customer may get bored 
and may not want to access the 
site again. 
x Local error 
x Customer disappointment. x Block system. 
x Interception of all 
info passed 
x Denial-of-service 
attack 
 Step 1- The customer 
enters the e-commerce 
website. 
MORE  – applied to 
customer. More
customers enter the web 
site. 
 
x Possibly legitimate
access by many interested 
users. 
 
 
x Service may be severely 
impeded. User browsing 
sessions may be very slow or 
else not accepted.  x Massive simulated
requests to enter the site by 
malicious processes. 
x Inadvertent or
deliberate overloading of 
system (denial of service 
attack) 
 This is tricky. We 
could make 
browsing subject to 
log on (unusual). 
We could monitor 
requests for signs 
of actual user 
behaviour (rather 
than program based 
requests of a 
malicious agent) 
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Elements Guideword-Deviation Cause Effects Threats involved. Comments 
 OTHER THAN – the 
customer attempts to 
enter the indicated web 
site but is directed to 
another (possibly spoof 
of the original) 
x Malicious handling at 
local host. 
x Domain squatting on 
addresses along the path. 
x Use of similar names 
for company, leading to 
customers being misled 
(e.g. via search engine 
returns). 
 
x Goes to wrong site 
generally. Customer is simply 
engaging in a spoofed or plainly 
wrong interaction with obvious 
consequences. 
x Spoofed sites have obvious 
problems. Reputation of 
company may (wrongly) be 
tarnished. 
Manipulation of host or 
routing 
 
Be on lookout for 
attempted 
infringements of 
name. 
 
Search for links 
with similar names 
to that of the 
company. 
NO – The customer 
nnot enter to the 
ion. 
ca
sect
x Link is not available 
x Firewall 
x Link is available but 
there has been denial of 
service 
x Customer’s disappointment 
x Customer may get bored 
and may not want to access the 
site again. 
Fabrication of website  Step 2- The customer 
enters to Browse 
Catalogue section. 
OTHER THAN – The 
customer enters a section 
other than Browse. 
x Internal error on web 
site. 
x Communications are 
altered in transit to reflect 
different request (but to 
same web site). 
Various – ranging from 
annoyance and bewilderment 
through to accessing sensitive 
information the customer 
shouldn’t. 
x Largely internal 
system inconsistency. 
x Manipulation of 
communications. 
 
Step 3- The system 
displays lists of products 
to the customer. 
NO – The system was 
unable to display the 
products. 
x The server is down (or 
part of system is down if 
distributed server). 
x The system is blocked. 
x Browser mismatches. 
x Error in database. 
Customer’s annoyance 
Plus, the company is not able to 
advertise any products. 
x Block system 
x Virus/hacking 
There may be good 
legal reasons why 
this is should be 
the case!  Is there 
material which 
should have age 
limit imposed? 
 21
    
Elements Guideword-Deviation Cause Effects Threats involved. Comments 
 MORE – The system 
shows more than the lists 
of products than it is 
supposed to. 
x Staff mistake. 
x Data (status e.g. 
sale/not yet on sale) of the 
associated product is 
incorrect. 
x Added product from 
the outsider (e.g. advertise 
on this website) 
x Search filters not 
working appropriately. 
x Data release may have 
unfortunate effects: product not 
on sale is being displayed, and 
will become unavailable when 
the customer orders it, leading 
to customer dissatisfaction. 
Product displayed with old price 
and old detail, which the 
company needs to sell at the 
price it advertises. The 
organisation’s reputation is 
effected if the product on sale is 
not suitable or illegal. 
Overloading with irrelevant 
information. 
x Modification of
message (communication 
channel). 
 
 
This really 
illustrates the 
importance of 
having accurate 
information on a 
web-site. There are 
all manner of 
commercial /legal 
reasons to do so. 
x Modification of
website (file). 
x Modification of the 
storage files of product. 
 
What exactly is 
meant by “is 
supposed to”? Are 
there legal 
constraints on what 
should be 
displayed? 
 
Illustrates need to 
enforce sales 
policy within the 
law. This has 
implications for the 
details we store 
with actual 
customers. 
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Elements Guideword-Deviation Cause Effects Threats involved. Comments 
LESS – The system 
shows lists of products 
less than it is supposed 
to. 
x Staff mistake. 
x Data (status e.g. 
sale/not yet on sale) of the 
associated product is 
incorrect. 
x Outsider’s fabrication 
x Corruption of message 
passing. 
x Supplier’s frustration 
x Lose the opportunity to sell 
a particular product. 
x Modification of
message (communication 
channel). 
 
 
Begs the question 
as to how lists are 
requested. At this 
stage it is not stated 
whether this is 
simply by 
hyperlinks or else 
by search criteria. 
x Modification of
website (file). 
x Modification of the 
storage files of product. 
REVERSE – The 
system shows lists of 
product in a reverse or 
unusual order. 
x Possible manipulation 
of communications but 
principal cause is simply 
deliberate action server 
side. 
x A different (including 
reverse order) may influence 
selection to buy. 
x Malicious server
management/development
. 
 Psychological 
issues must be 
taken into 
consideration. Who 
are the customers 
who have products 
here – are some 
being favoured? 
Can we make 
money openly from 
this? Note – some 
producers may 
actually pay to 
appear on a web 
site. 
 
OTHER THAN – The 
system shows something 
else or incorrect data 
associated with products. 
x Outsider’s fabrication 
x Replacement or redirect 
to other fake website to 
obtain customer’s
information. 
 
 
x Customer may be misled by 
erroneous data. The server 
management may be legally 
obliged to sell at whatever price 
was advertised for example. 
x Page not available 
(internal misconfiguration). 
x Internal server
data/configuration errors. 
 
x Customer’s disappointment 
to see what is not expected. 
 
x Fabrication of 
website 
x Man-in-the-middle 
attack 
x Incompetence 
interface design (threat). 
x Internal configuration 
management error 
(accidental or deliberate). 
Need controlled 
access to 
commercially 
sensitive 
information on 
server database. 
Whole new set of 
use cases 
(requirements) 
needed. 
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Elements Guideword-Deviation Cause Effects Threats involved. Comments 
 AS WELL AS – details 
are supplied to customer 
but also to a third party. 
x Comms monitoring 
x Profiling activities 
server side. 
x Possible breach of privacy. Passive monitoring on the 
net. 
Active monitoring by 
server (without 
knowledge of customer) 
What is the policy 
on privacy? Most 
likely issue here is 
the storing of 
profile data. What 
are legal issues? 
Step 4– The customer 
browses the catalogue 
for a particular product. 
NO – N/A     
NO – The customer 
cannot find the product 
he or she is looking for.  
x The product is not 
available within the system 
(normal case). 
x Information of the 
product was tampered with. 
x Packet was 
corrupted/or manipulated. 
x Information sent is not 
complete 
x Mismatch search 
criteria 
x Lose the opportunity to sell 
a particular product. 
x Customer dissatisfaction. 
x Modification 
(corruption) of message 
(communication channel). 
x Modification of 
website (file). 
x Modification of the 
storage files of product. 
Provide search 
results on similar 
searched words. 
Step 5 – The customer 
finds the product. 
OTHER THAN – The 
customer mistakes some 
other products for the 
product looking for. 
x Unclear description of 
the product 
x Trick the customer in 
choosing something
different. 
 x The company must do more 
work if the product if returned 
and refund requested. x  
x Customer’s frustration
when receive product that was 
not intentionally ordered for. 
 Distraction/manipulating 
the customer 
Something of an 
HCI issue. Need to 
consider interface. 
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Elements Guideword-Deviation Cause Effects Threats involved. Comments 
Post-condition – The 
product/s is found. 
NO – The product is not 
found. 
x The product is not 
available within the system 
(normal case). 
x Information of the 
product was tampered with. 
x Packet was 
corrupted/or manipulated. 
x Information sent is not 
complete 
x Mismatch search 
criteria 
x Lose the opportunity to sell 
a particular product. 
x Customer dissatisfaction. 
x Modification 
(corruption) of message 
(communication channel). 
x Modification of 
website (file). 
x Modification of the 
storage files of product. 
 
Table 8: Analysis of ‘Browse Catalogue’ use case. 
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Elements Guideword-Deviation Cause Effects Threats involved. Comments 
Use Case: Register customer 
Actor 
NO – Register action did 
not take place. Fail to 
register. 
x Interception by an 
intruder 
x Loss of network/server 
is down 
x Customer does not 
complete the registration by 
accident. 
x Decline registration 
x Customer losses trust in the 
company, if he has already 
submitted the detail but was not 
updated. 
x Need to register again. 
Interception of message 
passed through network. 
This can make the 
customer lose trust 
in the company’s 
overall service and 
might not want to 
do more important 
service (e.g. 
purchasing the 
products) with the 
company. 
MORE – Register 
customer more than 
required. 
x Repeated registrations 
(intentionally). 
x Duplicated or replayed 
of the message. 
x The system might not 
allow to change detail, so 
register again with different 
detail. 
x Increase work load to the 
system, and may result in the 
unavailability of the service. 
x Block other
communications with the 
system. 
 
x Repeated registration 
(Flood system). 
x Take advantage of “one per 
customer” offers. 
x Replay of message. Should allow 
customer to change 
detail after 
registration. 
LESS – N/A     
Customer’s action – 
Register customer 
OTHER THAN – 
Register someone other 
than oneself. 
x Phantom user
registration. 
 
 
Wrong user information 
received, resulting in inaccurate 
data gathered (e.g. number of 
customer interested in the 
product) 
x Customer provides
wrong information detail 
x Customer registers on 
behalf of other person. 
x Customer uses other 
person’s detail (steal info). 
 
Obtain other person’s 
detail. 
This raises the 
issues whether 
phantom users are 
of concern or not. 
Will it affect any 
offers or benefits? 
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Elements Guideword-Deviation Cause Effects Threats involved. Comments 
NO – Customer does not 
have ability to register 
customer. 
x Physical –loss
connection. 
 Not be able to process any order 
from the web-site. 
x Does not have 
registration information. 
x Confusion in what 
information to fill in. 
 This is the problem 
of the customer to 
provide sufficient 
information. 
 
The system could 
prompt required 
fields to be filled 
in, leaving others 
as optional. 
MORE – Customer has 
more ability to register. 
(Register using different 
identities or addresses) 
x Deviate some details 
such as names or addresses. 
x Swap places of 
surname and given name. 
x Different phonetic
spellings of non-English 
names. 
 x Profit loss for the company 
x The customer can take 
advantage of ‘one-per-customer’ 
offers or ‘one-per-household’ 
offers. 
Fraudulent multiple
registrations. 
 There is a possible 
need to detect and 
deal with 
fraudulent multiple 
registration. 
Customer’s capability – 
Register customer 
LESS – Customer has 
less ability to register. 
Duplicate of names in the 
database. 
x Customer disappointment 
x The company loses one 
potential customer. 
 This is an issue to 
be further 
discussed on how 
to distinguish 
people having the 
same names 
(possibly using 
emails). 
Association 
NO – Association with 
the particular customer 
does not take place. 
x Connection is blocked. 
x  
 
x Customer disappointment 
x The company loses one 
potential customer. 
Block connection 
Flood system 
 
NO – Associations with 
the customers do not take 
place. 
x Loss of network and 
other physical equipment. 
x Server is down 
x Customer disappointment 
x The company loses 
potential customers. 
Block connection 
Flood system 
Virus/hacking 
 
MORE – N/A N/A    
Association - Customer 
and Register Customer 
LESS – N/A N/A    
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Elements Guideword-Deviation Cause Effects Threats involved. Comments 
 OTHER THAN – 
Association with others 
(e.g. customer/or to an 
operator/or to an 
intruder) 
Normal operation (any body 
can register) 
  This raises issues 
on registration 
policy. Can a 
company worker 
be a potential 
customer? 
Use Case Element 
NO – The customer 
cannot enter to the 
Register Customer
section. 
 
x The web page is 
corrupted/removed. 
x Link is not available x Customer disappointment. 
x Customer may get bored 
and may not want to access the 
site again. 
Fabrication of website  
MORE – The customer 
enters to the section more 
than once. 
Keep refreshing or loading 
the same page. 
Not a problem.   
LESS – N/A     
Step 1 – The customer 
enters to the Register 
Customer section. 
OTHER THAN – The 
customer enters to some 
other section rather than 
the Register Customer 
section. 
x The page was replaced 
by an intruder. 
x Incorrect 
configuration/update 
(accidentally or 
maliciously) 
x Customer’s confusion  
x Company’s reputation 
x Confidential details can be 
revealed out, if the customer 
fills in the form which thought 
to be authentic. 
x Modification of 
website (file). 
x Modification of the 
storage files of product. 
 
NO –The new customer 
istration form is not 
splayed. 
reg
di
x Server is down 
x Interception by intruder 
x Wrong configuration/ 
naming. 
 
x Company loses opportunity 
for new potential customer. 
x Customer cannot register 
leading to customer 
dissatisfaction. 
 
Interception 
 
 Step 2 – The system 
displays the new 
customer registration 
form. 
MORE – More
information is displayed 
than intent on the form. 
 x Wrong form is 
displayed 
x Confidential data is 
displayed 
x Customer’s confusion 
x Confidential data can be 
seen by other people passing by 
the monitor display. 
 
Fabrication of web-site. Only sufficient 
information should 
be displayed. 
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Elements Guideword-Deviation Cause Effects Threats involved. Comments 
LESS – Incomplete form 
is displayed. 
x Interception 
x Wrong form is
displayed 
 
x Insufficient information 
received, may be useless or drop 
out from the registration 
resulting in customer’s
dissatisfaction. 
 
x Unauthorised 
modification of related 
files 
x Wrong information is kept 
in the system. 
x Interception Enough 
information should 
be displayed. 
OTHER THAN – Other 
form is displayed 
x The page was replaced 
by an intruder. 
x Redirect to a phantom 
web page. 
x Mistake made by staff 
x Customer’s confusion  
x Company’s reputation 
x Confidential details can be 
revealed out, if the customer 
fills in the form which thought 
to be authentic. 
Unauthorised 
modification of files 
/names 
 
 
 
OTHER THAN – a 
form is displayed by 
agent other than the 
system. 
x Man in the middle 
attack. Or agent
masquerading as the 
system. 
 
x Minor problem if new info 
is offensive but real problem 
comes next.  
Man in the middle attack.  
NO – The registration 
tail is not provided. de
Customer inaction. x Delayed registration 
x Failed registration 
 What happens if 
this is too late – a 
timeout? 
MORE – More
registration detail is 
provided than required. 
 Not a problem.    
Step 3 – The customer 
provides registration 
details. 
LESS – Less registration 
detail is provided than 
required. 
Customer is reluctant to 
provide real/enough
information. 
 
Insufficient information is 
registered. 
 Prevent by using 
mandatory fields 
(use system to 
check). 
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Elements Guideword-Deviation Cause Effects Threats involved. Comments 
 OTHER THAN – The 
customer provides some 
other detail. 
Same as OTHER THAN in 
Customer’s action 
Wrong user information 
received, resulting in inaccurate 
data gathered (e.g. number of 
customer interested in the 
product) 
Using inappropriate
identify i.e. right identity, 
wrong detail or wrong 
identity but right/wrong 
detail. 
 Potentially major 
problem.  
What are the 
details? 
What onus is there 
to check accuracy 
by other means? 
Age, address etc. 
Issues of faked 
identity? 
Legal issues (data 
protection Act etc.) 
NO – The customer does 
 submit registration 
tails. 
not
de
x Customer inaction/
refuses/changes his mind. 
 No new registration detail is 
stored. 
x Computer hangs 
Distract or trick customer Minor 
MORE – The customer 
submits more than once. 
x Customer mistakenly 
presses twice (over-eager 
customer) 
x Duplicate on network 
x Replay of message. 
x The same customer detail is 
updated twice. 
x The system ignores the 
duplicate information. 
Replay of message Issue here is really 
one of change. 
What is the policy 
on changing details 
once provided? 
This needs to be 
authenticated in 
some way 
otherwise A can 
have his/her details 
removed by B. 
This is connected 
with above. There 
is the possibility of 
user submitting 
multiple but 
different details. 
Step 4 – The customer 
submits Registration 
details. 
LESS – N/A     
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Elements Guideword-Deviation Cause Effects Threats involved. Comments 
OTHER THAN – The 
customer clicks on 
another button. 
x Mistake other buttons 
for the ‘Register Button’ 
 
x Loss of information 
entered. 
x Exposure of information to 
others. 
Distract or trick customer. Minor. 
OTHER THAN – The 
customer submits detail 
to someone else. 
x Interception by intruder x Disclosure of information Eavesdropping 
Interception 
 
 
AS WELL AS – The 
detail is sent while 
something else occurs  
x Internet gets 
disconnected. 
x Interruption by an 
intruder 
x Customer stops and 
wants to cancel 
x Extra event is initiated 
by customer or an intruder 
x Information may be 
stored in local buffer or else 
be retrievable by some 
means. 
x Information is simply 
sent to an intruder 
x Customer is not sure 
whether the detail is sent 
through or not. 
x Customer sends the 
information again if he/she still 
wants to carry out resulting in 
duplication of records. 
x Intruder may get details 
x Distract or trick 
customer. 
 
A page displaying 
confirmation that 
the information is 
received would 
lessen worries from 
the customers.  
NO – The information is 
not updated. 
x Connection loss before 
sending information 
x Interception 
x Error in server side 
(programming error,
physical loss, or from 
malicious actions) 
 
x Customer is not sure 
whether the detail is sent 
through or not. 
x Customer sends the 
information again. 
Interception  Step 5 - The system 
updates the information. 
MORE – Th
information is updated 
more than once. 
e x Error in server side 
x Duplicated or replayed 
of the information 
The same customer detail is 
updated twice. 
 
x Replay of 
information 
x Unauthorised 
modification of program 
on server side. 
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Elements Guideword-Deviation Cause Effects Threats involved. Comments 
LESS – N/A      
OTHER THAN – The 
system updates wrong 
information. 
x Message is corrupted 
by an intruder. 
x Error in the update 
program. 
The system obtains wrong 
information 
x Corrupt of message 
x Unauthorised 
modification of program 
on server side. 
 
NO – Customer is not 
registered to database. 
x Physical problems 
x Software problems (e.g. 
database) 
x Duplicate account
registered 
  
x Incomplete information 
provided. 
x Message corruption 
x Customer’s frustration. 
x The company lose
opportunity to sell. 
 
Maliciously attack 
physical or software 
components. 
 
MORE – Customer is 
registered to database 
more than once. 
x Update wrong by the 
program 
x Duplicate message 
received 
The same customer detail is 
updated twice. 
x Unauthorised 
modification of program 
on server side. 
x Replay of message 
Is there any policy 
against duplicate 
customers? 
Post-conditions – The 
customer is registered 
and the details saved to a 
database. 
OTHER THAN - 
Incomplete information 
is registered to database. 
x Update wrong by the 
program 
x Wrong/incomplete 
information is received. 
The system receives wrong 
information  
x Unauthorised 
modification of program 
on server side. 
x Modification of 
message via network. 
 
Table 9: Analysis of ‘Register Customer’ use case. 
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Elements Guideword-Deviation Cause Effects Threats involved. Comments 
Use Case: Order goods 
Actor 
NO – The customer does 
not order goods. 
x Unsatisfied with the 
product selections/price 
x Complicated interface 
x Distraction by the 
company’s opponent 
advertisement 
x Lose an opportunity to sell 
x Customer’s disappointment 
Hacking Provision of a user-
friendly interface 
design. Provision 
of security 
mechanism in 
preventing 
unauthorised pop-
up windows. 
MORE – The customer 
excessively order goods  
x Not the owner of the 
account/or card he’s using 
x Prank order with fake 
account. 
x The company sent order 
without getting paid later on. 
x The owner of the payment 
becomes furious when finds out 
that the order was not initiated 
by him. 
x Time wasted when verify 
payment detail with card 
company and turn out to be 
fake. 
x Increase workload to the 
company staff 
x Obtain password and 
card detail (steal, bribery, 
social engineering). 
x Get access to other 
computer, while logging 
on to the system. 
This raises the 
issues of whether 
the payment should 
be received before 
delivery or not. 
Customer’s action –
Order goods 
AS WELL AS – The 
customer provides
insufficient/incorrect 
detail when submitting 
order. 
 x Detail not available 
x Complicated interface 
x Typing mistake 
x Distraction 
x Processing of payment 
would be unsuccessful. 
x Customer’s disappointment 
x Increase workload to the 
company staff. 
x Steal/virus 
x Distraction 
Checks on 
mandatory field 
prior to accepting 
the request. 
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Elements Guideword-Deviation Cause Effects Threats involved. Comments 
 OTHER THAN – The 
customer intends to 
achieve something else 
rather than to order 
goods. 
Malicious intents Wrong statistics data on the 
number of customer access 
Disruption on the service 
Increase workload 
Flood/block the system 
Impersonating as
customer 
 
This raises the 
issues of whether 
to allow users to 
simultaneously log 
on using the same 
accounts. 
 
Customer’s capability – 
Order goods 
NO – The customer has 
no ability to order goods. 
x Physical – loss
connection. 
 Company misses the 
opportunity for one potential 
customer. x Does not have account/ 
payment information 
x The customer has not 
been registered (registration 
detail not available) 
x Disruption of
connections 
 This raises the 
issues of what 
method of payment 
should there be 
available for the 
customers. 
x Steal card/payment 
info. 
NO – The operator does 
not process the order. 
x Lack of responsibility 
in work 
x Order does not come 
through to the operator. 
x Order is lost/or has 
been modified. 
x Customer waits definitely 
for the goods order. 
x Customer’s disappointment 
x Financial loss to the 
company 
x Unauthorised 
modification of the 
message via network 
x Unauthorised 
deletion of order received. 
Should inform the 
customer on the 
approximate 
delivery date. 
MORE – The operator 
processes the order more 
than require. 
x Operator error 
(accidentally e.g. operator’s 
misinterpretation) 
x Software error 
x Corrupt of the message 
(by an intruder or network) 
x Greedy operator, 
pretends that he/she has 
received the order more 
than it was sent. 
x Financial loss e.g. the 
system sent out two orders but 
only get paid for one 
x Customer needs to pay 
twice if the both payment 
transactions are processed. 
x Corrupt the message. 
x Intentionally make 
mistake by the operator. 
 
Operator’s action – 
Process the order 
LESS – N/A     
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Elements Guideword-Deviation Cause Effects Threats involved. Comments 
OTHER THAN – The 
operator processes order 
with wrong information. 
x Operator error 
x Modification of
information in the database 
 
x The system sends out 
wrong order, leading to 
customer’s disappointment. 
x Greedy operator,
pretends that he/she has 
receives wrong information 
 x The customer needs to pay 
more than actually needs to. 
x Corrupt of the message 
via network or an intruder. 
 
x Corrupt the message. 
x Intentionally make 
mistake by the operator. 
  
OTHER THAN – The 
operator process order 
when not received. 
x Fabrication of order An incorrect order is sent out. 
 
Fabrication of order.  
NO – The operator has 
no ability to process the 
order. 
x No privilege to do so. 
x The supplier 
connection is not available. 
x Slow down the process. 
x Operator’s frustration 
Modification of the user’s 
privilege. 
Monitoring system 
should be useful 
for this purpose. 
MORE – The operator 
has ability to do more 
than processing the order 
(e.g. modify order). 
x Inaccurate/or no
privileged is set. 
 Operator is able to modify the 
order leading to financial loss 
and customer’s frustration. x Database is not 
protected. 
x Error in the program 
Unauthorised 
modification in database 
and software code. 
Assign appropriate 
privilege 
LESS – N/A     
OTHER THAN – N/A     
Operator’s capability – 
Process the order 
AS WELL AS – The 
operator has ability to 
some other process 
involving ordering of 
goods. 
x Responsibility/role is 
assigned incorrectly 
x Privilege assignment is 
incorrect. 
Operator is able to modify the 
order leading to financial loss 
and customer’s frustration. 
Unauthorised 
modification in database 
and software code. 
Assign appropriate 
privilege 
Association 
Association – Order 
goods and Operator 
NO – Order hasn’t 
passed to operator when 
expected. 
x Loss of network 
x Interception 
x Customer waits indefinitely 
for the goods ordered. 
x Other competitor may have 
better offer and offer to the 
customer, if the information is 
revealed. 
Interception  
 35
    
Elements Guideword-Deviation Cause Effects Threats involved. Comments 
MORE –More than one 
operator process the 
same order. 
x Operator error 
x Software error 
x Greedy company,
pretends to have receive 
more order 
 
x Customer receives more 
than one order but pays for only 
one, resulting to financial loss 
of the company. 
x Customer needs to pay for 
more than one order, if the 
payment transactions are 
processed. 
Unauthorised 
modification 
Need to protect 
customer. 
LESS –N/A     
OTHER THAN – Order 
goods is associated to 
someone other than the 
operator. 
x Hacking to the system 
x Intruder has access to 
the system (computer 
system or documentation) 
x Fake operator, 
impersonating real operator 
x Order goods is sent to 
wrong place (across 
network) 
Disclosure of information (e.g. 
account information, goods 
ordered info, payment detail, 
credit card number and etc.) 
x Hacking 
x Impersonating 
 
 
AS WELL AS - Order 
goods is associated to 
someone as well 
x Interception 
x Man in the middle 
attack. 
x Operator reveals the 
detail (accidentally and 
maliciously) 
Same as above. But the operator 
does not have knowledge that 
something has happened. Seems 
to still be normal. 
x Interception 
x Man in the middle 
attack. 
x Malicious insider 
 
Association – Order 
goods and Customers 
NO – Association with 
the customer does not 
take place. 
Connection is blocked Customer’s disappointment Block connection to the 
system. 
 
Use Case Elements 
Step 1 - The customer 
enters Order Goods 
section. 
NO – The customer 
cannot enter Order 
Goods section. 
x Link is not available 
x The web page for order 
good section is removed. 
x Customer disappointment. 
Customer may get bored and 
may not want to access the site 
again. 
Fabrication of website.  
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Elements Guideword-Deviation Cause Effects Threats involved. Comments 
MORE - The customer 
enters to the section more 
than once. 
Keep refreshing and loading 
the same page. 
Not a problem.   
LESS – N/A     
 
OTHER THAN - The 
customer enters to some 
other section rather than 
the Order Goods section. 
x The page was replaced 
by an intruder 
x Incorrect 
configuration/update 
(accidentally/maliciously) 
x Customer’s confusion  
x Company’s reputation 
x Modification of 
website (file). 
x Modification of the 
storage files of product. 
 
NO – The customer’s 
unt detail is not 
layed. 
acco
disp
x Account does not 
match 
x Wrong data is sent to 
retrieve info 
x Interception 
x Message corrupt 
x Customer will not be able 
to order goods leading to 
customer frustration or attempt 
to try to re-register again. 
x Disclosure of customer’s 
account detail. 
x Interception 
x Tap communication. 
x Corrupt the message. 
 
MORE – The system 
displays customer’s 
account detail more than 
necessary (e.g. card 
detail/security info).  
x Software error 
x Programming mistake 
Disclosure of customer’s 
account detail. 
Unauthorised 
modification of software 
Only sufficient 
information is 
needed to display. 
LESS – Essential detail 
is not shown. 
x Software error 
x Programming mistake 
x Interception 
x Disclosure of customer’s 
account detail. 
x Customer’s confusion 
Unauthorised 
modification of software 
Enough 
information is 
needed to display. 
OTHER THAN – The 
account detail displayed 
is inaccurate. 
x Modification of
account detail 
 Customer confusion to whether 
the detail is correct or not. 
x Interpretation of the 
account information is 
wrong. (Software fault) 
Same as above  
Step 2 - The system 
displays customer’s 
account detail. 
OTHER THAN – The 
system displays other 
customer’s account 
details. 
x Retrieval of the wrong 
detail (software error) 
x Wrong data is sent to 
retrieve info. 
Disclosure of other customer’s 
account detail. 
Same as above  
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Elements Guideword-Deviation Cause Effects Threats involved. Comments 
NO –The customer does 
not enter the goods 
detail. 
x Customer inaction N/A   
MORE – The goods 
entered are more than 
intended. 
x Incorrect update of the 
goods to the list of goods 
selected. 
x Customer clicks on the 
‘submit’ or ‘add’ button 
more than once. 
Customer’s frustration when get 
paid for goods not wanted. 
Unauthorised 
modification. 
The system should 
provide the list of 
the selected goods 
for the customer to 
view at any time. 
LESS – The goods 
entered are fewer than 
intended. 
x Incorrect update of the 
goods to the list of goods 
selected. 
x Customer does not 
click on the ‘submit’ or 
‘add’ button. 
 
Customer’s frustration when 
receive fewer order 
x Unauthorised 
modification. 
x Interception 
Same as above 
Step 3 - For each item 
that the customer wishes 
to order, the customer 
enters its detail. 
OTHER THAN – The 
customer enter wrong 
goods detail. 
Unclear product description 
 
Customer’s frustration when 
receive wrong order 
Unauthorised 
modification. 
Same as above. 
NO – The delivery detail 
is not provided. 
N/A    
MORE – N/A     
LESS – Insufficient 
delivery detail is
provided. 
 
x Customer provides
insufficient detail 
 x The order cannot be 
delivered. 
x Interception 
x Message is corrupted. 
x Goods are sent to wrong 
address. 
 
x Interception 
x Corrupt the message 
Mandatory field 
check. 
Step 4 - The customer 
provides delivery details. 
OTHER THAN – The 
customer provides
incorrect delivery detail. 
 
Trick customer to make 
mistake. 
Same as above Same as above Delivery 
confirmation page. 
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Elements Guideword-Deviation Cause Effects Threats involved. Comments 
 OTHER THAN – 
Delivery detail is 
provided by other person. 
x Intruder enters his/her 
own delivery detail instead 
of the customer 
x Modification of the 
message by the intruder 
Goods are sent to another 
address, while the payment is 
being deducted from the 
owner’s account, resulting to 
customer dissatisfaction 
Unauthorised 
modification of the 
message 
 
Step 5 - The system 
calculates and displays 
the price of the goods 
ordered. 
NO – The system does 
not or fails to 
calculate/display the 
amount due. 
Error in the program 
Interception 
Customer does not know how 
much is due and may be 
reluctant to submit any payment 
details. 
x Unauthorised 
modification of the 
program 
x Interception 
 
NO – The customer 
submits payment detail 
to the system
unsuccessfully. 
 
x Loss of internet 
connection 
x Server is down 
x Customer inaction 
 
x Customer is worried 
whether or not the payment has 
reached the system. 
x Other malicious person 
might attempt to make payment 
or capture payment detail if the 
customer is not around the PC. 
Block system. Confirmation page. 
 MORE – The payment 
detail is sent out more 
than once. 
x Customer accidentally 
submits more than once. 
x Replayed of message 
by an intruder. 
 
Payment transaction is made 
twice. 
Replay of message  
OTHER THAN – 
Incorrect payment detail 
is sent out (e.g. value of 
payment, card number) 
x Modification of
message by an intruder 
 x Customer has pay more 
than require 
x Customer enters
incorrect detail 
 x The payment’s validation 
fails resulting in customer’s 
dissatisfaction.  
Corrupt the message Payment should be 
checked before any 
orders can be 
processed. 
Step 6 - The customer 
submits payment detail. 
OTHER THAN – The 
customer submits
payment detail to other 
systems/users (message 
is revealed). 
 
x No encryption of 
messages 
x Payment detail is sent 
to wrong place. 
x Disclosure of payment 
detail to a third party. 
x Order is not processed if the 
system has not received the 
payment detail. 
x Tap communication. 
x Interception 
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Elements Guideword-Deviation Cause Effects Threats involved. Comments 
OTHER THAN – 
Payment detail is 
submitted but not by the 
customer. 
x Intruder fakes a 
payment message. 
 
The payment transaction is 
rejected by card company. 
Modification of message.   
AS WELL AS – Other 
process occurs when 
payment is submitted. 
x Loss of internet 
connection 
x Intruder initiates other 
process 
x Customer initiates other 
process. 
Customer has no idea if the 
payment has already taken 
place. 
Block system Confirmation page. 
NO – The system does 
not confirm the result of 
the transaction 
x The system is
intentionally blocked from 
sending back the message 
so that the payment can be 
carried out without the 
customer knowing. 
 Customer’s worry 
x Loss of network and 
other communications 
Block system Confirmation page 
or send a 
confirmation e-
mail to the 
customer. 
Step 7 - The system 
confirms the result of 
transaction. 
MORE – The system 
confirms result more 
than once. 
Duplicate of message Customer is worried on how 
many transactions are made for 
the payment. 
Replay of message.  
Step 8 - The operator 
processes the order. 
NO – Same as above in 
operator’s action. 
    
NO – The data is not 
received. 
x Loss of network 
x Interception 
x System is blocked 
No ordering and purchasing 
taken place. 
x Block system 
x Interception 
 Post-condition - The 
order and its detail are 
received and processed.
  MORE – Superfluous 
information is received. 
Modification of the message Wrong delivery/payment detail 
causing customer’s annoyance 
towards the company. 
Modification of message.  
Table 10: Analysis of ‘Order Goods’ use case. 
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Elements Guideword-Deviation Cause Effects Threats involved. Comments 
Use Case: Change password 
Actor 
Operator’s action – 
Change password 
MORE – Operator 
repeatedly change
password 
 
Operator wants to use the 
same password still but was 
forced to change, so needs 
to change until he can use 
his original password. 
Vulnerability to attacks if same 
password is used. 
Social engineering, to 
convince the operator to 
use the same password. 
Strictly enforce the 
password policy. 
Operator’s capability – 
Change password 
NO – The operator has 
no ability to change the 
password. 
x Operator cannot
remember old password 
 Vulnerability to attacks if same 
password is used. 
x The old password is 
incorrect. 
  
Association 
OTHER THAN – 
Change of password by 
someone else. 
x Obtain of old password 
x Change in password 
files or database. 
Unauthorised person may freely 
use the system for his/her own 
benefits. 
Steal, social engineering, 
bribe. 
Passwords in 
database/files 
should also be 
protected or 
encrypted. 
Association – Operator 
and Change password 
NO – No association 
between ‘Change
password’ and the 
operator.  
 
x Operator does not 
change password. 
 
Vulnerability to attacks if same 
password is used. 
Social engineering, to 
convince the operator to 
use the same password. 
Enforce the 
passwords to be 
changed regularly 
Use Case Element 
Pre-conditions – The 
operator is logged on. 
NO – The operator 
cannot log in.  
x Loss of network/ 
software problems 
x Account and/or 
password are incorrect 
x The operator was 
blocked 
x Account is disabled 
 
No activities can be done. x Block system 
x Modification of the 
stored account 
information. 
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MORE – More than one 
user/operator log on with 
the same account. 
Obtain account information 
and password. 
Unauthorised person may freely 
use the system for his/her own 
benefits. 
Steal, social engineering, 
bribe. 
Enforce only one 
user to be logged 
on at a time. 
LESS – N/A     
 
OTHER THAN – The 
account is logged on by 
someone else. 
Obtain account information 
and password. 
Unauthorised person may freely 
use the system for his/her own 
benefits. 
Steal, social engineering, 
bribe. 
 
NO – N/A     
MORE – The password 
is entered with many 
attempts. 
x Intruder repeatedly
guesses the password. 
 Unauthorised person may freely 
use the system for his/her own 
benefits. 
 Time-out and block 
the system if a 
number of attempts 
have exceeded. 
LESS – N/A     
Step 1. - The operator 
enters his old password 
OTHER THAN – The 
operator enters an 
incorrect password. 
Incorrect password is 
entered. 
The password validation fails   
Step 2 - The system 
validates password. 
NO – The system was 
unable to validate 
password. 
x The password does not 
match the existing password 
in the system. 
x Password stored was 
changed by an intruder 
The password validation fails. 
The operator is not able to 
access the system. 
Modification of the stored 
account information. 
 
NO – N/A     
OTHER THAN – The 
operator enters wrong 
password in the second 
time 
Typing mistake Password will not be changed.   
Step 3 - The operator 
enters his new password 
twice 
OTHER THAN – The 
operator enters a
password twice which is 
not expected. 
 
x Wrong position of hand 
on keyboard 
x Character is sent wrong 
from keyboard 
x The password is stored 
incorrectly. 
Operator will be unable to 
logon. 
Modification of the stored 
account information. 
 
 42
    
Elements Guideword-Deviation Cause Effects Threats involved. Comments 
NO – The change detail 
was not sent out. 
Loss of network and 
connection 
Operator will be unable to 
logon. 
Block system  
MORE – The change is 
sent out more than once. 
The operator clicks the 
button twice. 
Not a problem.  The system should 
prevent ‘double 
clicking’ action. 
Step 4 - The operator 
confirms the change 
OTHER THAN – The 
operator confirms the 
change for detail not 
expected (the detail sent 
out is wrong). 
Modification of the message 
after transmitting. 
Operator will be unable to 
logon. 
Modification of the 
message 
 
NO – The password is 
not changed. 
x Program error 
x Password input
contains invalid character 
 
Operator will be unable to 
logon. 
  Step 5 - The system saves 
password to the system. 
OTHER THAN – The 
system saves wrong 
value of password. 
x Program error 
x Intruder 
Operator will be unable to 
logon. 
x Spoofing 
x Modification of the 
stored account 
information. 
 
Post-condition –
Password is changed. 
 Same as above     
Table 11: Analysis of ‘Change Password’ use case. 
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6.3 The results 
 
The analysis identifies unexpected behaviours of the system and the actor, as the 
results from the application of the HAZOP guide words to the use case elements. 
Causes and consequences of each behaviour are identified. Further comments and 
recommendations can be investigated. This section summarises results obtained from 
the case study analysis. 
 
The results highlight potential threats to the system. For example, impersonation, 
message corruption or unauthorised accesses to the system (by social engineering, 
bribery, stealing, hacking etc.) are identified as possible threats. The likelihood of 
these threats should be subject to further analysis, so that correct measures can be 
provided.  
 
An issue raised from the discussion during the analysis is the order of the product lists 
displayed to the customer. The use case for browsing a catalogue stipulated that a list 
of relevant products be returned to the customer. One of the attributes of a list is the 
order in which the items appear (as anyone familiar with search engines will know). 
Applying OTHER THAN on this attribute led to discussions of the possible effects of 
different ordering and possible means of resolution.  
 
Another example of security-related issue raised is the realisation that the user identity 
representation is non-trivial. As part of the registration process a user was required to 
submit his or her ‘details’. Although our use case checked that the exact details had 
not already been registered, minor variants could easily be accepted as those of 
distinct customers. For example, Jeffrey Herebeacker and Jeffrey Hearbehacker would 
be considered distinct. There may be good pragmatic reasons why customers should 
not have multiple identities, but there are security issues too. What if we wanted to 
have of ‘one-per-customer’ offers? Similarly, the intent of ‘one-per-household’ offers 
could be circumvented easily by adopting minor variants of street name (the postal 
service in the UK is  known for its ability to deliver very badly addressed post).  This 
suggested that a more sophisticated and fuzzy notion of equality of details might be 
needed. Thus, although it might be ‘obvious’ when two sets of details are the same 
and when they are not, simply considering the application of OTHER THAN to 
details prompts us to consider in more detail what we really want, and reveals 
potential deficiencies in the mechanism we have chosen to implement. Though the 
technique does not solve the issue, it successfully highlights it for consideration.  
 
Several other potential attacks identified in the analysis are due to the vulnerabilities 
of the payment process and the handling of confidential details. These suggest to the 
developer that the security policy for how the payment and the confidential details are 
to be handled should be made explicit and analysed further. 
 
Additional functional requirements arise from the analysis. Some of these 
requirements are derived to help prevent or mitigate the likelihood of the 
vulnerabilities. The following are some of the derived requirements extracted from 
Table 8 to Table 11. 
 
1. The system needs to check mandatory fields (e.g. all required payment details 
are filled in). 
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2. There is a need to provide functions to allow customers to update/modify their 
detail (in order to avoid unnecessary repeated registration). 
3. Acknowledgement messages should be provided to users to confirm actions 
taken (messages sent). Thus the technique highlights issues relevant for good 
HCI design. 
4. There is a need to provide/display confirmation details before processing the 
payment of the transaction. 
5. There is a need to provide session time out (to protect against users wandering 
away from terminals etc). 
6. Modification of web-site data should only be done by an authorised person in 
an appropriate manner. (This may be obvious but was certainly not explicit.) 
7. There is a need for communications protection. Again, this may seem obvious, 
but the work exposed various assumptions being made about confidentiality 
and integrity of such communications.  
8. There is a need to specify and enforce a policy on password maintenance. 
9. There is a need to consider how abnormal or incomplete transactions should 
be handled. Additionally, there are obvious needs for the maintenance of a 
secure audit trail for appropriate accountability. 
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7. Discussion and conclusions 
 
7.1 Summary of major findings 
 
HAZOP provides a systematic approach to reasoning about the high-level security of 
a system modelled in use cases. It can be seen as a useful tool in the security analysis 
armoury. The worked study we have presented here is small but has allowed us to 
draw conclusions on the utility of the general technique. Below we summarise our 
observations on the experience of applying HAZOPs to the e-commerce example. 
 
x HAZOPS helps the derivation of security requirements and policy. The 
analysis process is an effective means of teasing out security requirements. At 
their simplest these will be additional functional requirements. However, we 
found that the analysis process often provoked discussion about higher-level 
policy issues. In some environments the security policy may be implicit and in 
many cases will be incomplete. HAZOPS prompts the analysis team to think in 
ways they would not otherwise have done. 
 
x HAZOPS highlights issues. HAZOPS provides problems and issues, not 
solutions! It forces the analyst to consider unusual scenarios. Sometimes the 
issues thrown up have no clear solution (e.g. one could deal with the provision 
of multiple identities by ignoring them and not offering ‘one per customer’ 
offers). Also, in trying to interpret what is meant by particular natural language 
descriptions one occasionally finds lower level design possibilities being 
discussed. Though strictly inapplicable at the use case level, lower level 
implementation issues can be unearthed and recorded for consideration. 
Inevitably, much design is iterative and in many developments there is some 
degree of working ahead (and so aspects of implementation will proceed before 
higher levels have strictly been finished). Working ahead with forethought 
should save misguided effort being spent. 
 
x HAZOPs can be applied to all use case elements.  Associations are often 
glossed over in normal developments but have significant security relevance, 
raising fundamental questions about who should have accesses to which 
services. An assumption is typically made in use cases that the actor remains 
constant throughout a transaction. However, this assumption can be subjected to 
perturbation, leading to issues of masquerading and impersonation etc. The very 
existence of association as a concept leads to this sort of thinking. Once an 
element is identified it can be challenged by perturbation and the consequences 
considered. Insight is typically needed to generate the scenarios. Although not 
all security problems will be identified via consideration of perturbations of the 
core use cases, the method does seem to yield useful information and prompts a 
much more systematic analysis. 
 
x Abstraction from communications hides threats. In our web-based system the 
principals in transactions are distributed. The language in the use cases often 
obscures the underlying communications needed. Thus, ‘the system presents to 
the customer’, really involves sending the appropriate data across the web, 
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though this is nowhere mentioned. This abstraction hides attacks based on 
message interception/spoofing. We found in practice that we did address some 
communications security issues. Also, in uses cases, simple acknowledgement 
messages are often omitted. This too can hide or even create threats. If no 
acknowledgement is actually implemented, a user may induce a transaction 
again (e.g. buying air tickets for a second time over the web, thinking the first 
transaction initiated has been aborted). 
 
x Viewpoint prompts are useful! We have found it very useful to wear various 
‘hats’ in carrying out the analysis. These are what are usually referred to as 
viewpoints. Even simple considerations such confidentiality, availability, 
integrity, accountability and timing prompt the analysts to highlight issues in 
these areas. Analysts are free to generate these as appropriate. One could easily 
imagine environmental viewpoints (e.g. temperature, which may have a distinct 
effect on smart card operations), a passive eavesdropper viewpoint, a 
maintenance viewpoint, or a cleaner’s viewpoint! 
 
x There are more actors than you think. Determining what you have forgotten 
is hard! The analysts must attempt to consciously search for such additional 
considerations. Thus, for example, cleaners did not appear in any of the previous 
analysis, and yet they may have physical access to terminals and servers. 
 
x Elicitation of attack patterns. The HAZOP based approach helps in elicitation 
of patterns of attack, as well as analysing and creating a process of developing a 
pattern library. For example, analysis reveals implicit protocols between the user 
and the system – and deviations from these protocols; this could form a pattern 
that can be applied generally. 
 
x Uses cases are programs too! Although we have deliberately applied the 
technique to high-level scenarios, this is not essential.  A normal program is a 
sequence of actions, with preconditions and preconditions. The HAZOPs 
approach can be applied to lower levels of design/implementation (mutatis 
mutandis). 
 
The use of the technique itself is also observed.  The following are some observations 
made on the results and procedure in carrying out the techniques:  
 
x There is a lot of repetition: we need a way of summarising the useful findings. 
The results produced are very repetitive. This is probably because the same 
guidewords are applied to each element and action step of the use case, some of 
which are very similar. Generalization of the identified threats would be one 
possible approach in summarising the findings. 
 
x Team-based analysis. Any team-based analysis approach is more powerful than a 
single-user equivalent; creativity is encouraged, and alternative views are aired 
and discussed.  Because the systematic analysis of the use cases was carried out by 
a team (here the three authors), the coverage is wider and deeper than an initial 
exploration by one of the authors. It is also observed that roles in the team are 
important. Different roles have different interests on the system (i.e. privacy, 
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availability and confidentiality). This would help the discussion and raises issues 
that we might not normally consider. 
 
x Issues of scoping: individually apply guidewords to each term. For more 
detailed analysis of a particular function or behaviour, each individual term or 
sub-statement could be thoroughly analysed by applying the HAZOP guidewords 
to. This creates more possible deviations to a particular function. However, we 
need to see if the findings are worth the effort. 
 
x Use case-based analysis.  Of course, the technique makes use of use case 
modelling as the underpinning of the analysis. The thoroughness of the analysis 
highly depends on how detail and accurate the use case is constructed and the 
level of abstraction you would like to achieve.  
 
x Flexibility. Guidewords are adjustable. Interpretations can be modified according 
to certain types of the system.  
 
x Time-consuming and tedious. Most systematic approach consumes more time, 
however producing a more thorough result. It is preferably to spend more time and 
effort to identify what is significant to the system at the early stage of the 
development. This sort of observation seems intrinsic to the technique. It applies 
also to some other thorough forms of test, e.g. mutation testing. Automated 
support for carrying out and recording the analysis. Indeed, since ideas often come 
quickly, a dedicated recorder who does not participate in the technical discussions 
may well be appropriate. In our efforts, we typically recorded ideas on a 
whiteboard and recorded them formally afterwards. 
 
7.2 Conclusions 
 
The role of security analysis is becoming increasingly important. Systems are 
becoming more complex and are now operating in environment with higher risks. 
Consequences of such systems failure are of high concern. The method, presented in 
the paper, provides a more rigorous approach in carrying out security analysis. It is 
intended to supplement other forms of analysis and should be integrated with it. 
 
The simple case study has demonstrated that it is possible and beneficial to adapt 
HAZOP (technique widely used in safety community) to Use Case (which is primarily 
used for capturing functional requirements) to provide a more systematic approach for 
security analysis. The future work in this area could include: (1) generation of attack 
patterns from the analysis results, (2) further application to other descriptive types 
(e.g. procedures, informal descriptions, protocols described using message sequence 
charts), (3) generalisation of threats results and (4) implementation of tool support. 
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